We identify birth wantedness as a source of better child outcomes. In Vietnam, the year of birth is widely believed to determine success. As a result, cohorts born in auspicious years are 12 percent larger. Comparing siblings with one another, those of auspicious cohorts are found to have 2 extra months of schooling. The Vietnamese horoscope being gender-speci…c, this di¤erence will be shown to be driven by birth planning; children born in auspicious years are more likely to have been planned, thus bene…tting from a more favorable growth environment.
Introduction
What are the sources of child health and schooling outcome heterogeneity? Becker and Tomes (1976) provided theoretical insights into the family determinants of child development. At the same time, the related empirical literature has put a large emphasis on gender bias, birth order and birth spacing. 1 In all of this work, fertility was viewed as essentially a deterministic process. We instead highlight that parents may have to cope with an unexpected pregnancy, the implications of which we investigate in this paper. 2 While Goldin and Katz (2002) documented the e¤ect of the introduction of the birth control pill on career and marriage outcomes of American women, little, however, is known about the importance of birth planning for child welfare. These issues are relevant for researchers and policy makers alike who wish to understand and address the factors a¤ecting child development.
Vietnam, the country of interest in this study, o¤ers a peculiar cultural setting that will allow us to address this question. Speci…cally, there is a commonly shared belief that an individual's year of birth is a determinant of ability, success, and character. Accordingly, we …nd a sharp fertility response, whereby years that are considered auspicious have significantly larger cohorts. Furthermore, when comparing siblings with one another, those born in auspicious years are found to have more years of schooling. Exploiting the fact that the Vietnamese horoscope di¤ers between boys and girls, we show that the observed schooling di¤erences are due not to the horoscope being accurate or self-ful…lling, but rather to birth planning; children born in auspicious years are more likely to have been planned by their parents, thus bene…tting from a more favorable growth environment. 1 See also Behrman et al. (1982) , Sheshinski and Weiss (1982) , and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988) for theoretical discussions on the intra-household allocation of resources. The empirical literature on sex preference includes among others Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) , , Thomas (1994) , Rose (2000) , and Du ‡o (2003); , Hauser and Sewell (1985) and Black et al. (2005) looked at birth order e¤ects; Rosenzweig (1986) and Conde-Aguelo et al. (2006) are among studies that investigated the impact of birth spacing on child outcomes. 2 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) used the exogenous fertility shock provided by multiple births to identify the interaction between the quantity and quality of children.
We believe our …ndings to be a signi…cant contribution to the literature on child wantedness for at least three reasons. 3 First, most attempts to address the importance of being wanted have relied on self-reported assessments of wantedness, although these self-reports are likely to be biased. 4 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Bachrach and Newcomer (1999) discussed the methodological shortcomings of using self-reported measures of child wantedness. Our strategy instead relies on the property that the horoscope of a child carries information about whether or not she was planned by her parents. Second, identi…cation of child wantedness has generally been obtained out of comparison between rather than within families. This methodology is, however, subject to a composition bias; if some unobserved parental characteristics drive both the likelihood of an unexpected pregnancy and the child's growth environment, then such latent heterogeneity confounds the e¤ect of child wantedness.
Therefore, reduced-form estimates of the impact of fertility planning policies obtained from e.g. Donohue and Levitt (2001) or Pop-Eleches (2006) should not be interpreted as evidence of child wantedness without making strong identi…cation assumptions on the nature of cohort composition. 5 Our use of family …xed-e¤ect estimations largely alleviates this problem since parental ability to both control fertility and provide child care is being factored out when comparing siblings with one another. 6 Finally, the literature on child wantedness has often concluded that an unexpected pregnancy could lead to worse child outcomes because parents care inherently less about children who were not desired, whereas the potential income e¤ect associated with an unplanned birth has largely been discarded. Our …ndings suggest that such omission is not necessarily warranted, and this has implications for the 3 see Gipson et al. (2008) for a review of the literature 4 One exception is Joyce and Grossman (1990) , who instead predict wantedness based on observables in a two-step Heckman selection model. 5 For example, Gruber et al. (1999) …nd that poorer households are more likely to be a¤ected by changes in abortion regulation. Explicitly controlling for observed confounders still leaves unaddressed the problem of residual latent heterogeneity such as parental valuation of time (see e.g. Cawley and Liu, 2007) . 6 Chalasani et al. (2007) also adopt a …xed-e¤ect speci…cation to compare siblings with varying degrees of wantedness. However, wantedness is measured based on self-reported assessments, and the authors do not control for birth order in their speci…cations.
interpretation of these earlier results and the formulation of policy prescriptions. To remind ourselves of this identi…cation problem, we henceforth refer to birth plannedness rather than birth wantedness.
We therefore believe our paper sheds new light on some of the mechanisms that could also be factors underlying the documented impact of abortion regulation on socioeconomic outcomes such as schooling and crime. 7 To conduct our empirical investigation, we use the Vietnam 1999 population census to compare birth cohort sizes across years. Years that are believed to bring good luck to either boys or girls have birth cohorts that are on average 12 percent larger. There is furthermore no evidence that sex ratios and astrology are correlated, which invalidates hypotheses of sex-selective abortion or gender-biased infant mortality rates being driven by the horoscope. We use data on education from the population census and on health from the 2001 Vietnam National Health Survey, and we …nd that children of auspicious cohorts have higher levels of education measured by the number of years spent in school. There is, on the other hand, no evidence of any di¤erence in long-term health (measured by heightto-age). Comparing children across families is subject to a composition bias similar to the one mentioned above, whereby parents more able to time fertility according to the horoscope might have unobservable traits that also a¤ect the quality of child rearing. Family …xed- 7 Our paper is also related to the literature on the complementarities between parental investments and children's endowments (see e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988 ). We do not …nd evidence that parents invest either more or less in their child's human capital depending on whether or not she is perceived to be more able. Admittedly, the interpretation of our results is subject to the caveat that the child's horoscope is only one aspect of her perceived ability. It is nevertheless important enough to trigger a 12 percent fertility response. Our paper also deals with issues of religion and beliefs in a way similar to Goodkind (1991 Goodkind ( , 1996 and Lee and Paik (2006) , who document how the horoscope can in ‡uence birth timing among Chinese and Korean families respectively. The former …nds evidence of a "dragon-year baby boom" among the Chinese populations of South-East Asia, while the latter shows that Korean families avoid the inauspicious year of the horse to have children. Akabayashi (2006) looks at the consequences of the baby bust in Japan associated with the year of the Fire Horse (1966) on the marriage market. Similarly, Vere (2008) exploits superstitious beliefs in Hong Kong to look at the impact of fertility on female labor participation.
e¤ect estimations still indicate that a child born in an auspicious year for either boys or girls will attend school an extra 2 months compared to his or her sibling born in a year auspicious for neither boys nor girls. In addition, cohort-size spillover e¤ects, through which larger cohorts exert a positive in ‡uence on individual human development, are ruled out since no association between cohort sizes and educational outcomes is detected. We are then left with two potential mechanisms to explain our results. On the one hand, the child endowment channel postulates that children born in auspicious years are either e¤ectively or believed to be more able. They might then feel more con…dent and their parents might dedicate more resources to their education. On the other hand, the birth plannedness channel argues that children born in auspicious years are more likely to have been planned by their parents, thus bene…ting from more favorable conditions for human development.
To disentangle these two channels, we rely on a second feature of Vietnamese astrology; the horoscope is di¤erent for boys and girls so that there are years that are auspicious for boys exclusively (i.e. inauspicious for girls), and vice and versa. Given that gender is not known at the time of the fertility decision, we can test whether di¤erences in outcomes are driven by ex-ante planning (the birth plannedness channel) or ex-post horoscope (the child endowment channel). 8 To illustrate the intuition, let's consider the following Vietnamese three-child family. Bao and Giang are twins; Bao is a boy, while Giang is a girl. They are born in a year that is auspicious for boys exclusively, i.e. bad omen for girls. Bao and Giang have a sister, Nga, who is born in a year that is auspicious for neither boys nor girls.
According to the horoscope, Bao is a lucky child, while his two sisters are both unlucky. By comparing the three siblings, we can assess the empirical relevance of child endowment versus birth plannedness in determining child outcomes. If child endowment is the driving force underlying sibling di¤erences, we should observe better outcomes for lucky Bao compared to his unlucky twin sister Giang, but not …nd any di¤erence between the two unlucky sisters Giang and Nga. On the other hand, if birth plannedness is the key determinant of sibling heterogeneity, we would not expect any di¤erence between the two twins, while Giang should exhibit better human development outcomes than her sister Nga because she is more likely to have been planned by her parents who targeted an auspicious year for either boys or girls to give birth to her and her twin brother. Our empirical strategy does precisely that. We …rst look at children born in years auspicious for either boys or girls, and …nd no evidence of better outcomes for the child for whom gender and horoscope match (we actually …nd the opposite). We then restrict our sample to unlucky children: boys born in years auspicious for girls exclusively, girls born in years auspicious for boys exclusively and children born in years auspicious for neither. Unlucky children born in years auspicious for the other sex are still found to have better outcomes than equally unlucky children born in years auspicious for neither. Birth plannedness is therefore believed to be the main mechanism underlying the observed heterogeneity between children born in years of varying auspiciousness.
Finally, we …nd that the e¤ect of the horoscope on child outcome is stronger among groups such as ethnic minorities that are less likely both to believe in the Vietnamese horoscope and put an emphasis on child quality, but more likely to face …nancial constraints. Such results suggest that the inability to smooth an income shock associated with an unexpected pregnancy plays a role in explaining sibling outcome heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 sketches the cultural framework underlying astrology and superstition in Vietnam. In section 3, we lay out a simple model of parental fertility choice and resource allocation to guide our discussion, and after a description of the data in section 4, we present and discuss our results in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
A Short Overview of Vietnamese Astrology
In this section, we brie ‡y describe the basis of Vietnamese astrology. To the connoisseur, this overview will surely look over-simpli…ed. At the root of Vietnamese superstition is the Preferences and household production. In each period t = 1; 2, parents make fertility decisions (P t ) t=1;2 : P t = 1 indicates that parents plan to have a child, and P t = 0 otherwise. Actual fertility follows the process:
(1) is born whenever planned, while an unplanned pregnancy occurs with probability 1 . In each of these two periods t 2 f1; 2g, the endowment W t is split between a consumption good C t and a child rearing good Z t . One can also think of C t and Z t as time spent on domestic tasks and child rearing, respectively. If they don't have a child, parents'instantaneous utility is simply U t = U , for some U > 0; otherwise it takes a Cobb-Douglas form:
where Y t is the child's human development outcome and t 2 f L ; H g is a taste parameter:
higher values of t indicate that parents care more for a child born in period t. To capture the issue of child wantedness at the heart of our paper, we assume that t = H if and only if P t = 1 : parents care more for a child born when planned. We account for heterogeneity of outcomes across families and across siblings within a family by assuming the production of human capital Y t to be log-separable:
where , the same parameter as in (1), measures the household's ability to produce human capital (H is increasing); N t is the child's birth cohort size and (:) captures cohort size spillover that a priori can be either positive ( increasing) or negative ( decreasing) ; Z t is the amount of education good consumed by the household, and t 2 f L ; H g with L < H is the endowment of the child.
Parental investments and human development outcomes. In years where a child is born (I t = 1), the …rst-order condition governing parental choices Z t takes the form
R Z is (the inverse of) the relative price of investments in human capital.
The second-order condition, R ZZ
; is assumed to always hold. For further discussions, we consider the following supermodularity condition:
which formalizes the property that education and child's endowment are "su¢ ciently"complement. Under standard regularity assumptions, the implicit function theorem implies that there exists a di¤erentiable function (W t ; t ; t ) such that in equilibrium,
and (:) is increasing in W t and t , and increases in t if and only if (4) holds. Investments in child rearing increase if parents have a relatively higher preference for their child, have higher income, or the net private returns to child rearing are larger. Plugging (5) into (3) and taking logs yields
where y ln Y; ln R, ln H, and ln :
Horoscope and birth cohort comparisons. Without loss of generality, we assume that t = 1 is an auspicious year, while t = 2 is inauspicious. A fraction of parents are superstitious and therefore believe that
believe that child endowment is not correlated with the horoscope. Thus, in this economy, a fraction
of parents choose to have a child in t = 1, while 1 2 of them choose t = 0 instead. 9 Parents will furthermore decide to allocate resources to periods of fertility, i.e.
therefore equals
where
11 OLS E (y) aggregates three e¤ects: 9 The corresponding parameter restriction is U <Ũ (W; H ; L ), whereŨ is the parental indirect utility when investments are determined by (5) : To rule out the case where parents wish to have a child in both periods, we further assumeŨ (W; L ; H ) < U : 10 In this model, the only reason why parents may wish to have lower income in periods of fertility is when the risk of an unexpected pregnancy is su¢ ciently high and wealth and ability and preference parameters are su¢ ciently substitute. To see this, we note that the income timing decision is driven by the di¤erence
AsŨ is increasing, there exists a threshold^ < 1 such that the di¤erence is positive for all ^ : if the risk of an unexpected pregnancy is low enough, then parents allocate high income in periods of fertility. If supermodularity condition (4) holds and health outcomes are normalized in such a way that
such threshold^ can be as low as^ = 0 : parents such that = 0, have a child born in both periods, and the optimal allocation of resources will depend on the complementarity between W , and . Supermodularity is a su¢ cient condition for parents to be willing to match high income with high levels of and . 11 For each , de…ning
: Given fertility process (1), we integrate over :
. The expression for OLS E (y) follows immediately.
(i) Sibling heterogeneity,
; that can be formally decomposed into: -Child endowment: children born in auspicious years might be truly more gifted, or are believed to be so, thus bene…ting from better (resp. worse) treatment from their entourage in a world where higher (resp. lower) endowment decreases (resp. increases) the relative price of investments in human capital. Note that for this e¤ect to hold, parental beliefs about their child's endowment is su¢ cient: conditional on perceived endowment, true endowment does not matter for parental investments.
(ii) Cohort-composition, R ( ) 1 dF ( ), whereby the unobserved ability to control fertility can also drive children's outcomes. This e¤ect has for example been documented by Gruber et al. (1999) who found that poorer mothers were more likely to be a¤ected by an abortion ban.
(iii) Cohort-size e¤ects, 1
, which are either positive (peer e¤ects, increasing returns) or negative (congestion, crowding out of common resources).
Behrman and Birdsall (1988) …nd positive spillover among Brazilian male cohorts, arguing that larger cohorts increase the demand for skilled labor and thus the returns to schooling.
On the other hand, Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004) show that increased female labor supply after World War II had the e¤ect of depressing female wages.
The expression for OLS E (y) also applies for the analysis of fertility planning policies and their impact on child human development outcomes. The empirical speci…cation used in most contexts is the following di¤erence-in-di¤erences framework:
where y ijkt is the outcome of child j born to household i in region k in year t. G kt is a measure of family planning in region k in year t, while X ijkt is a vector of characteristics that include child attributes (gender, age...), household-level time-invariant characteristics (parental education and age,...), and region-level time-varying information. 12 As suggested above, under the proposed econometric speci…cation,^ 1 is a reduced-form estimate of the three forces at play described above. Little more can be said without making strong assumptions on the ability of observable variables (X ijkt ; t ; k ) to account for cohort composition.
The context of our paper is di¤erent and o¤ers a lot of time variation in the horoscope:
it is as if family planning policies were changing every year, becoming more liberal in auspicious years, while more restrictive otherwise. Thus every household is subject to high frequency changes in fertility incentives. This allows the use of household …xed-e¤ects that control for both observable and unobservable time-invariant factors that drive the cohortcomposition e¤ect discussed so far. This pins down to comparing siblings within families that have children born in years with varying horoscope. The average di¤erence in outcomes
Our proposed speci…cation to estimate
where G t now captures the horoscope in year t. The unobserved and time-invariant household 12 For example, in assessing the impact of family size restrictions such as the One-Child policy in China (see Qian, 2008) , G kt would instead capture the coerciveness of the regulatory regime in region k and year t.
Similarly, a minor modi…cation of our modeling assumptions would allow us to address the impact of abortion regulation on outcomes (assuming for example that Pr kt (childjplanned) = 1, and Pr kt (childjunplanned) =
(1 ) (1 G kt ), where G kt 2 f0; 1g indicates the abortion regulatory regime: G kt = 1 if and only if abortion is legal in region k in year t):
variables that could be a threat to the identi…cation of 1 are now captured by …xed-e¤ects j .
On the other hand, because the horoscope is not region speci…c, the use of time …xed-e¤ects is not feasible. Identi…cation of F E E (y) is therefore subject to the additional assumption that the time trend g (t) is correctly speci…ed. Our empirical investigation will estimate F E E (y) and focus on disentangling that di¤erence further.
Data
The This di¤erence is a …rst indication of fertility decisions being in ‡uenced by the horoscope.
The following section addresses this question formally.
Empirical Results

Astrology and birth timing
We …rst look at the extent to which fertility timing decisions are correlated with the Vietnamese horoscope by estimating the following equation:
in which N t is the national-level aggregate number of children born in year t, G t is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 if year t is an auspicious year according to Vietnamese astrology, and 0 otherwise.
As discussed in section 2, males are "Yang"and females are "Yin", so that horoscopes for boys and girls are likely to be di¤erent. We will thus adopt several speci…cations for variable G t : (i) whether year t brings luck to boys, (ii) girls, (iii) both, or (iv) either. The results of the estimation of (9) are shown in Table 3 , panel A. The …rst column shows signi…cantly larger cohort sizes in years that are auspicious for either boys or girls. The di¤erence is estimated to 11.7 percent, which is similar to earlier estimates from Goodkind (1996) Graphically, the e¤ect of astrology is illustrated in Figure 1 this, is that according to Vietnamese astrology, the year of the dragon is not systematically an auspicious year and neither is the year of the horse always bad omen as shown in Table   1 . Nevertheless, some zodiac animals (Zhi) such as the Snake are never good omen, while others, e.g. the Goat or the Pig, are never bad omen. We might then expect large fertility responses during these years. Appendix Table A2 does not show any evidence of a Goatyear or Pig-year "baby boom"(column 1) but some indication of a Snake-year "baby bust"
(column 2). 13 
Reduced-form results
We now test the hypotheses discussed in the previous section. We estimate the following equation:
in which y ijt is the outcome of interest (education and health) for child i born in year t into family j, and X ijt includes individual, household and commune-level controls. In all subsequent speci…cations, G t is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if child i 0 s year of birth t is auspicious for either boys or girls, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-birth level. Table 4 shows the result from the estimation of (10) : Column 1 shows that a child born in an auspicious year is likely to stay 0.3 more years in school. No comparable e¤ect is detected when looking at long-term health, measured by height-to-age (column 4). We include household, parental and commune-level controls in the estimation of (10). The results in columns 2 and 5 show smaller coe¢ cients, yet qualitatively similar to the estimates provided in the regressions without controls. Although parents'socioeconomic background 13 Appendix Table A2 also looks at alternative speci…cations for G t , given that years can be auspicious, inauspicious but also "neutral"(see Table 1 ). In particular, column 3 suggests that parents do not necessarily try to avoid years that are bad omen for either boys or girls. Yet, as shown in columns 4 and 5, cohorts in inauspicious years for boys are signi…cantly smaller. However, there are only three such years in our sample, and these years also overlap with our original variable. Column 6 presents the results of the estimation of (9) after dropping years that are inauspicious for boys, and the results suggest that our earlier results are not so much driven by parents avoiding inauspicious years, but rather by parents aiming at auspicious years.
Finally, column 7 restricts the sample to children for whom we have data on education, i.e. children above the age of 5 at the time of the census: results are stronger than with the entire sample.
might a¤ect child's educational outcome, controlling for observable characteristics does not a¤ect dramatically the observed positive correlation between astrology and schooling. As emphasized in the theoretical section,ĉ OLS is an estimate of OLS E (y), the combined e¤ects of sibling heterogeneity, cohort composition and cohort size spillovers.
To account for cohort composition, we estimate F E E (y) by estimating a parametric version of (8):
Education policies and infrastructure being largely determined at the provincial level, we cluster standard errors at the province level in education regressions, and at the communelevel for health regressions. 14 The results are presented in columns 3 and 6, and are consistent with the ones presented previously. While no signi…cant di¤erence in height is detected, children born in auspicious years report higher levels of schooling than their siblings born in non-auspicious years (column 3). Thus, we draw the conclusion that the observed di¤erence in schooling is not entirely driven by a selection bias, whereby parents better able to time fertility in tune with the horoscope are also better able to invest in their children's human capital. Given that the cohort-composition e¤ect has been dealt with, we are then left with fewer alternative mechanisms to which we now turn.
What are the mechanisms at work?
First, the cohort-size channel assumes that the horoscope a¤ects education through increased birth cohort sizes. In our context, this would mean that larger cohorts generate positive spillovers. Second, the child endowment channel, through which children born in auspicious years are intrinsically more gifted or beliefs that they are so induce better treatment, assuming resources and endowment are complements. Finally, the birth plannedness channel: in an auspicious year, children are more likely to have been planned, so that …nancial or a¤ective conditions for their future growth are likely to be more favorable.
14 The commune is the smallest administrative unit in Vietnam. The country consists of 10 090 communes grouped into 589 districts that form 58 provinces as of 1999.
Cohort size
We …rst attempt to rule out cohort-size e¤ects and test the hypothesis H 0 : 0 (:) = 0.
Controlling for cohort size in equation (11) does not allow identi…cation of c as larger cohorts are also better-o¤ cohorts. We nevertheless add measures of cohort size in equation (11), with the expectation that the estimate of c is going to be biased downward. In Table 5 , column 1 reproduces the result of Table 4 
where y ijkt is educational outcomes for child i born to household j in region k and year t.
Family and year-of-birth …xed e¤ects are controlled for and d therefore captures the extent of cohort size spillover. Results are presented in Table 5 , columns 5-7: cohort sizes at the commune, district or province-level do not show any statistically signi…cant association with educational outcomes. We therefore cannot reject that there are no cohort size spillovers i.e. that 0 (:) = 0: We consequently rule out the possibility that our results are driven by the positive e¤ect of larger birth cohorts characterizing auspicious years.
Explaining sibling heterogeneity: child endowment or birth plannedness?
Cohort composition being controlled for and cohort size spillovers being ruled out, sibling heterogeneity is hereafter the reduced-form e¤ect of child endowment and birth plannedness.
We can rewrite F E E (y) as follows:
The child endowment e¤ect, Z + ; is driven by two dimensions of child endowment: true and perceived endowment. The child's true endowment has a direct e¤ect on his or her subsequent human development, while his/her perceived endowment (whether it re ‡ects the truth or not) a¤ects the relative price of education, that in turn determines parental investments and eventually child outcomes. Assuming that being born in an auspicious year does not determine true but only perceived endowment, we will be able to assess the extent to which di¤erences across siblings are driven by initial di¤erences in perceived endowment that are then exacerbated by parents' allocation of resources across children.
The child endowment e¤ect is therefore reduced to In order to implement these tests, we observe that the gender of the future child is not known when the fertility decision is made, and that auspicious years for boys usually di¤er from auspicious years for girls. We can then see whether ex-ante planning or ex-post horoscope matter for subsequent human development outcomes. If child endowment is the driving force behind our results, then a boy must be born in an auspicious year for boys, and a girl must be born in an auspicious year for girls in order to be privileged. On the other hand, in the birth plannedness scenario, irrespective of gender, being born in an auspicious year for either boys or girls is the only thing that matters. We construct the dummy variable born-lucky de…ned by g ijt = 1 if and only if child i born to family j in year t is a boy and t is an auspicious year for boys, or i is a girl and t is an auspicious year for girls: We then estimate equation (11) with both variables G t and g ijt on the right-hand side. Results are presented in Table 6 , columns 1 and 2. The results suggest that most di¤erence in education are driven by fertility planning rather than the self-ful…lling horoscope. Admittedly the two variables G t and g ijt are highly correlated with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.75, making a de…nitive interpretation of the results di¢ cult.
To address this issue further, we restrict the sample to birth cohorts born in auspicious years for either boys or girls. We compare children for whom horoscope and gender match (g ijt = 1 : boys born in years auspicious for boys and girls born in years auspicious for girls)
with children for whom they don't (g ijt = 0 : boys born in years auspicious for girls only and girls born in years auspicious for boys only). By construction, the sample of children considered in this analysis is characterized by W = = 0, so that in regression Table 6 , columns 3 and 4 show the results of the estimation, and if anything, among birth cohorts born in auspicious years, being lucky is negatively correlated with schooling outcomes. However, given the gender-biased nature of the horoscope (there are twice as many years auspicious for boys than years auspicious for girls), the negative coe¢ cient also re ‡ects the fact that overall, boys have fewer years of schooling than girls born in the same year (cf. table 4). We nevertheless leave open the possibility that the negative coe¢ cient re ‡ects parental compensation for unlucky children who were otherwise planned.
An alternative approach consists of restricting our sample to a subset of children for whom = 0. We therefore focus on children such that g ijt = 0 : these are boys born in a year auspicious for girls only (hence not auspicious for boys), girls born in a year auspicious for boys only (hence not auspicious for girls), and children born in a year auspicious for neither boys, nor girls. If, for this subset, we run the following regression:
Column 5 in table 6 shows that among unlucky children, those who were born in a year auspicious for either boys or girls are doing better than otherwise; even though the horoscope is not favorable to these children, being the fruit of fertility planning translates into better schooling outcomes.
The results presented here suggest that the intra-household allocation of resources does not depend on parental perceived endowment of the child as we could not reject the null that 0: Thus, di¤erences in outcomes between siblings is not driven as much by a relative price e¤ect of education as it is by birth plannedness, which is either an income e¤ect ( W > 0) or an intrinsic di¤erence in taste for children ( > 0) who were planned versus their siblings who were not.
More on birth plannedness
Given that birth planning seems to be central in explaining di¤erences in outcomes between siblings, we come back to the question of child wantedness. As we mentioned in the introduction, we did not refer to child wantedness throughout the paper because we believed that the literature on child wantedness had largely been assuming away the income e¤ect that accompanies an unplanned pregnancy ( W > 0), and reduced its interpretation to a preference argument: unwanted children are worse-o¤ because parents intrinsically value them relatively less than their "wanted" siblings ( > 0). Our results so far do not allow us to disentangle these two alternative explanations of birth plannedness. We have so far isolated the path linking the horoscope to schooling outcomes:
Looking at the heterogeneity of the e¤ect of the horoscope on educational attainment might allow us to push the analysis further. Di¤erences in the e¤ect of the horoscope across groups are driven by:
(i) Prevalence of superstitious beliefs: If members of a group are not superstitious, then comparing cohorts with di¤ering horoscope is irrelevant, while widespread superstition translates into large sibling heterogeneity as
(ii) Credit constraints: in our model, we assumed that parents do not have access to credit markets to optimally allocate income across periods. To somehow relax this assumption, we assume that heterogeneity in credit market access can be captured by heterogeneity across groups in the magnitude of W . With perfect credit markets, W = 0: If an unplanned pregnancy is associated with a larger income shock, then one might expect larger sibling di¤erences when access to credit is more di¢ cult as
(iii) Family endowments: another source of heterogeneity works through di¤erences in family endowments. Parents can di¤er by how they value or perceive the average "quality"of their o¤spring, and by their average income level. In the model, the determinants of sib heterogeneity are the di¤erences in resources between planned and unplanned children (namely W;
, and ), while di¤erence-in-di¤erences also depend on family endowments, i.e.
( L + H ) : Thus, whether the birth plannedness e¤ect is stronger among larger, wealthier and more educated families living in urban areas is ambiguous. We e¤ectively expect this subset of families to put a higher emphasis on the quality versus quantity of children, be wealthier and face a smaller price of education. While more average schooling is unambiguously expected for children of these families, the relative magnitude of sibling heterogeneity is uncertain and is ultimately an empirical question.
We estimate (10) with family …xed-e¤ects and interaction terms. Table 7 displays the regression results. Birth plannedness seems to a¤ect boys more than girls. Moreover, the results indicate that birth plannedness matters less for …rst-born children, as we expect the …rst child in the family to be expected eventually (column 1). Columns 2 to 7 document how household characteristics a¤ect the relationship between astrology and schooling. Columns 2 to 4 document a larger e¤ect of birth plannedness in smaller families (column 2), in families with more educated parents holding more assets (column 3), or in urban families (column 4). As these families are expected to be less rather than more credit constrained, the positive coe¢ cient suggests that either superstition is more prevalent among this subgroup, or di¤erences in family endowments yield wider sibling heterogeneity. Column 5 indicates a larger e¤ect of the horoscope on educational outcomes among ethnic minorities (non-Kinh and non-Hoa): while ethnic minorities are less likely to adhere to Vietnamese astrology (as suggested in the fertility response regressions, Table 3 , panel A), previous evidence suggests that di¤erences in family endowments would have yielded an opposite result: the negative interaction term is then suggestive evidence that more restricted access to credit markets however makes it more di¢ cult to cope with an unplanned pregnancy.
Conclusion
Superstition in Vietnam 
Dependent variable logarithm of birth cohort size
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Constant not reported. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the year-of-birth level (columns 1-2, 4-5), the province level (column 3) or the commune level (column 6). The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All regressions include a constant, a quadratic time trend, a set of month of birth and birth order dummies. Socio-economic status is captured by assets (Census, columns 1-3) and per capita expenditure (Survey, columns 4-6) Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the province level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All regressions include a constant, a quadratic time trend, family fixed-effects, a gender dummy, and a set of month of birth and birth order dummy variables. 
All
Full sample Auspicious year cohorts
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the province-level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Regressions include a constant, a quadratic time trend, a set of birth order dummies, and month of birth dummies. Columns 3 and 4 restrict to years that are auspicious for neither boys nor girls. Column 5 restricts to boys born in years not auspicious for boys and girls born in years not auspicious for girls. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the province level. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. All regressions include a constant, a quadratic time trend, a set of birth order dummies, month of birth dummies, and family fixed-effects. Coefficients of interactions with some asset variables not presented when there is no statistical significance to report.
Dependent variable: Education (years)
